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BETRAYAL ON TRIAL: JAPANESE-
AMERICAN "TREASON" IN WORLD WAR II
ERIC L. MULLER*
This Article tells the story of the federal treason trial of three
Japanese-American sisters for helping their paramours, two
German soldiers, to flee from a Colorado prisoner-of-war camp in
October of 1943. At the time, the story seemed to confirm the
suspicion of national disloyalty that had forced the sisters and tens
of thousands of other Japanese Americans from their West Coast
homes in the spring of 1942. But a careful review of the record of
the case reveals that the women were disloyal only to their
husbands, not to their country. The government presented the jury
with no evidence that the sisters intended to advance the cause of
the Axis Powers or to betray the United States. The jury convicted
them of conspiracy to commit treason nonetheless.
Reviewing the leading literature on law and loyalty, this Article
concludes that the story of this wartime treason trial illustrates the
dangers of stereotype and xenophobia that lurk in the law of
treason.
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INTRODUCTION: OF LOYALTY AND THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN
INCARCERATION' •
In early 1942, when the federal government decided to evict
every person of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast, Japanese-
American guilt was universally assumed. Every man, woman, and
child was a potential saboteur. "The Japanese race is an enemy
race," 2 explained General John DeWitt, the commander of the
Western Defense Command, who ordered their eviction. Citizenship
meant nothing: Japanese-American citizens were as suspect as aliens
because, in the military's view, "the racial strains [were] undiluted"3
in the second and third generations. Factual innocence also meant
nothing. "The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date,"
DeWitt explained as the program of repression began, "is a disturbing
and confirming indication that such action will be taken."4
We know now that the military got this colossally wrong. Mari
Matsuda calls it "the lie of military necessity,"5 and that is an apt
description. The military overestimated the security risks that
Japanese Americans posed by orders of magnitude.6 This is not just a
historical fact; it is also now a legislative one.7 When Congress
capped a multi-year historical investigation with the Civil Liberties
1. I use the term "incarceration" rather than "internment" because "internment" is a
misnomer. See Roger Daniels, Words Do Matter: A Short Note on Inappropriate
Terminology and the Incarceration of the Japanese Americans, in NIKKEI
(DIS)APPEARANCES (Louis Fiset & Gail M. Nomura eds., forthcoming 2004).
"Internment" is a lawful form of detention that may be deployed against certain aliens
during wartime. Id. Citizens may not be "interned." Id.
2. Memorandum from J.L. DeWitt, Lieutenant General, to the H.L. Stimson,
Secretary of War (Feb. 23, 1942) [hereinafter DeWitt Memorandum], http://www.unc.edu/
-emuller/isthatlegal/DeWitt2.jpg (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Mari Matsuda, Foreword: McCarthyism, the Internment and the Contradictions of
Power, 40 B.C. L. REV. 9, 17 (1998).
6. See JACOBUS TENBROEK ET AL., PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 93
(1968) (revealing military rumors of poisoned vegetables, undercover signal devices, and
the "concentration" of Japanese settlement near "strategic military and industrial areas").
7. The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903, 903 (1988)
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-5 (2000)).
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Act of 1988, it concluded that the "evacuation, relocation, and
internment of civilians [of Japanese ancestry] during World War II
[had been] ... carried out without adequate security reasons and
without any [documented] acts of espionage or sabotage."8
This last point-that there were no documented instances of
disloyal conduct by Japanese Americans in the United States during
the war-has become something of a mantra in the modern account
of the Japanese-American wartime experience.' On this point the
modern account has an almost reactive feel: it is as though we are
seeking to atone for the outrage of presumed disloyalty and
monolithic suspicion by hinting at a story of uncomplicated loyalty
and monolithic innocence.10
Intriguingly, this all-or-nothing dynamic, a stark distinction
between heartfelt loyalty and abject disloyalty, persists in popular
discussion within the Japanese-American community itself about its
incarceration experience. Consider the tortured sixty-year-long
8. Id.
9. See Proclamation No. 4417, 3 C.F.R. 8 (1976) ("We now know what we should
have known then-not only was that evacuation wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and
are loyal Americans."); COMM'N ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF
CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED 475 (1997) (stating that Japanese Americans
were evicted from their homes and forced into assembly centers "despite the fact that not
a single documented act of espionage, sabotage, or Fifth Column activity was committed
by an American citizen of Japanese ancestry or by a resident Japanese alien on the West
Coast"); DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 97 (2003) ("[Tlhere was never any evidence to
support the concern that the Japanese living among us posed a threat. None of the
interned Japanese was ever charged with, much less convicted of, espionage, sabotage, or
treason."); Victor Bascara, Cultural Politics of Redress: Reassessing the Meaning of the
Civil Liberties Act of 1988 After 9/11, 10 ASIAN L.J. 185, 202 (2003) ("Japanese Americans
proved not to be a security threat; no instances of espionage or sabotage ever surfaced.");
Neil Gotanda, The Story of Koermatsu, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 262 (Michael
C. Dorf ed., 2004) ("Notwithstanding ... lurid reports, actual incidents of espionage
among Japanese-American residents on the West Coast were nonexistent after Pearl
Harbor."). One popular website on the incarceration experience sums it up this way:
"The mass removal of persons of Japanese ancestry ordered by the President, supported
by the Justice Department, implemented by the Army and sanctioned by the Supreme
Court, was based on the pretext of 'military necessity,' a justification which later proved
groundless and without evidence." National Asian American Telecommunications
Association, Executive Order 9066, available at http://www.jainternment.org/ww2/eo9066.
html (last visited Apr. 28, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
10. I myself have emphasized the absence of documented subversion in my own early
writing on the subject. See Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1395, 1411 (1999) ("There was not a single documented incident of subversion by any
[person of Japanese ancestry] on the United States mainland."). But see WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 189-207 (1998) (crediting allegations of potential
subversion by Japanese Americans); PAGE SMITH, DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL 436 (1995)
(noting possibility of mixed loyalties of Japanese Americans).
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debate about military service by the internees." Some Japanese-
American veterans still insist that all those who resisted the draft
from inside the camps were unpatriotic;12 their fervor on the issue is
matched only by those who insist that each young man who refused to
comply with his draft notice was a patriotic "resister of conscience."' 3
Or consider the discomfort that still can arise when a person admits
that his family was at Tule Lake, the camp to which the government
sent most of those from the other camps who "failed" the written
loyalty test that it administered to all camp residents early in 1943.
To some, Tule Lake is still the "bad" camp, the camp of the "no-
no's,' 1 4 and nothing will persuade them otherwise.
The story I tell in this Article does not sit comfortably in the
conventional narrative of Japanese-American patriotism. It is the
story of the Shitara sisters, three American women of Japanese
ancestry who helped two German war prisoners escape from their
POW camp in eastern Colorado in the fall of 1943. They gave the
prisoners civilian clothing, some maps, and a nighttime lift south
toward Mexico. There is no question that they did this. They were
not framed. It was not an imagined event.
There is also no question that theirs was a case of disloyalty, even
betrayal. After all, the three Shitara sisters were all married,15
although the dislocation of the incarceration experience had
temporarily separated them from their husbands. The German
soldiers were their lovers, and their car trip into New Mexico included
some back-seat romance.
. Had the government accused the sisters of the crime of betraying
their husbands, their story would have been of little, if any, historical
11. See ERIC L. MULLER, FREE TO DIE FOR THEIR COUNTRY 183-86 (2001).
12. See Sus Satow, Who Are the Resisters of Conscience?, RAFU SHIMPO, Apr. 11,
2002, http://www.resisters.com/news/apology-satow.htm (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
13. See Mits Koshiyama, Who Are the Resisters? An Answer, NICHI BEI TIMES, Apr.
30, 2002, http://www.resisters.com/news/apology-koshiyama.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
14. The phrase "no-no" refers to the negative answers that some internees gave to
two questions about their loyalty on a questionnaire that the government administered in
the relocation centers in early 1943. See Chizu Omori, The Loyalty Questionnaire, in
GUILT BY ASSOCIATION: ESSAYS ON JAPANESE SETTLEMENT, INTERNMENT, AND
RELOCATION IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN WEST 277 (Mike Mackey ed., 2001) [hereinafter
GUILT BY ASSOCIATION]. The questions asked whether an internee was willing to serve
in the armed forces and whether he would foreswear allegiance to the Emperor of Japan.
See id.
15. Shitara was the maiden name the sisters shared. Each had a different married
name-Wallace, Otani, and Tanigoshi. See infra note 49.
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importance. But the government accused them instead of the crime
of betraying their country, bringing treason charges against them
early in 1944. After one of the most headline-grabbing trials of
World War II, a jury convicted the sisters of conspiracy to commit
treason, and a federal district judge sentenced them to two years in
prison. From all appearances, their case was the one that was not
supposed to exist-a documented act of disloyalty by Japanese
Americans on the U.S. mainland during World War II.
As notorious as the case was in its day, this treason prosecution
against the three Japanese-American sisters barely appears in the
voluminous literature on the wartime experiences of Japanese
Americans.16 Perhaps part of the reason for this absence is precisely
that it appears to clash with the narrative of Japanese-American
loyalty that prevails in scholarship on the Japanese-American
incarceration. But while the story may not at first seem to have a
comfortable home in that literature, I will argue that it does have a
home in the literature on law and loyalty. That literature has
captured well the danger of xenophobic repression that lies in
government efforts to use law to enforce bonds of national identity.
The treason trial of the Shitara sisters is a classic and clear illustration
of that danger. The Shitara sisters were guilty of a foolish, and
serious, indiscretion. Although married women, they allowed
themselves to be seduced by enemy soldiers, and offered their lovers
help in escaping captivity. Their motive was romantic. But because
they looked like the enemy, their motive became political and their
serious indiscretion became treason in the eyes of federal prosecutors.
Part I of this Article tells the story of the Shitara sisters' wartime
affair, and how it became the treason case of its day. Part II offers a
brief summary of the leading accounts of the law's interaction with
loyalty, and shows how the Shitara sisters' case confirms a central
danger that inheres in efforts to use the law to enforce national
loyalty. This Article concludes that the experience of the Shitara
sisters should play a prominent and unashamed role in illustrating the
civil rights tragedy we call the Japanese-American incarceration.
16. For the only mentions in the literature on the Japanese-American incarceration,
see generally KUMIKO TAKAHARA, OFF THE FAT OF THE LAND: THE DENVER POST'S
STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II (2003) and
Kumiko Takahara, Japanese American Women: Guilty by Race and Gender, in GUILT BY
ASSOCIATION, supra note 14, at 219. A very brief account of the episode also appears in a
book about German prisoners of war in the United States. See ARNOLD KRAMMER,
NAZI PRISONERS OF WAR IN AMERICA 128 (1979).
2004] 1763
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I. THE TREASON TRIAL OF THE SHITARA SISTERS, DENVER, 1944
A. Escape from Camp Trinidad
In October of 1943, 167,748 prisoners of war were incarcerated in
the United States, of whom 119,401 were German and 48,252 were
Italian.17 While our post-war television culture depicted Allied war
prisoners as clever and their Axis captors as incompetent, 8 the reality
was otherwise: German and Italian war prisoners were a crafty
bunch, and Americans were not especially skillful captors. During
the course of the war, 2,222 German prisoners escaped from prisoner-
of-war ("POW") camps in the United States.19 Ten percent of the
Germans who escaped remained at large for at least three days, and
somewhat incredibly, seventeen escaped German war prisoners were
still at large in November of 1947.20 The circumstances of these
escapes were often deeply embarrassing to the U.S. Army, which had
responsibility for guarding the war prisoners. In one typical instance,
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover reported to Attorney General Francis
Biddle that a military sentry at a camp a mile and a half from the Rio
Grande River was caught on guard duty at 1:30 in the afternoon
"sitting on an oil can so drunk he couldn't walk straight," telling those
in his charge that they could go "wherever [they] want[ed].
' 21
Security at the Trinidad POW camp in eastern Colorado was
particularly lax in the second half of 1943. Camp Trinidad housed
more than three thousand German soldiers, most of them prisoners
taken in North Africa.22 Escapes by twos and threes occurred
throughout the month of September, 1943.23 On the morning of
October 18, 1943, six German prisoners were discovered missing all at
17. See KRAMMER, supra note 16, at 271.
18. I refer, of course, to the television show "Hogan's Heroes," in which Colonel
Hogan and his American, British, and French co-captives routinely outsmarted Colonel
Klink, Sergeant Schultz, and the rest of their German captors.
19. See KRAMMER, supra note 16, at 136.
20. See id.
21. See Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Francis Biddle,
Attorney General (Oct. 27, 1943) (on file with the National Archives, Record Group 60,
Entry 114BK, Box 2, File 146-16-13).
22. See Memorandum from Lieut. Col. Birge Holt, to the Inspector General (Jan. 12,
1944) (on file with the National Archives, Record Group 159, Entry 26E, Box 724,
"Prisoner of War Camp, Trinidad, Colorado").
23. See Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Francis Biddle,
Attorney General (Sept. 7, 1943) (on file with the National Archives, Record Group 60,
Entry 114BK, Box 2, File 146-16-5); Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI,
to Francis Biddle, Attorney General (Sept. 15, 1943) (on file with the National Archives,
Record Group 60, Entry 114BK, Box 2, File 146-16-7).
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once.2 4 Two of them, Heinrich Haider and Hermann Loescher, were
picked up late that night in a beer hall eighty-seven miles away from
Camp Trinidad in the town of Watrous, New Mexico, drinking and
carousing with some local women after trying to buy train tickets.'
They told the arresting officer that they had escaped on their own, by
cutting through a wire fence, hopping a southbound freight train, and
buying the civilian clothing they were wearing with a small amount of
American money that they had smuggled into camp with them from
North Africa. 6 They reportedly explained that they were planning to
"go to Mexico and board any Spanish ship for Germany. ''27 Haider
and Loescher would eventually have a good deal more to say about
their escape and their plans,28 but this was the last time they ever
mentioned a plan to return to Germany, or, for that matter, to do
anything to support Germany.
When asked about the other four escapees, Haider and Loescher
said that they believed the others had escaped days earlier, possibly as
early as October 11.29 A check with the commander of Camp
Trinidad confirmed that it was possible that "all of the prisoners
could have escaped on October 11th, 12th, or 14th and their escapes
not have been discovered until the FBI was advised on October
18th. '3°  FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover sounded the alarm in a
memorandum to Attorney General Francis Biddle on October 23.
"[O]bviously," Hoover wrote, "an extremely dangerous condition is
being permitted to exist."31 "Such laxity not only renders it more
difficult to apprehend the escapees," warned Hoover, "but of more
importance, it seriously endangers the nation's security. '32 It was not
until October 21 that the rest of the escapees were caught.
24. See Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Francis Biddle,
Attorney General (Oct. 20,1943) (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
25. See Teletype, FBI El Paso, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Oct. 19, 1943)
[hereinafter Teletype, FBI El Paso] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
26. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI REPORT (Oct. 30, 1943)
[hereinafter FBI REPORT (Oct. 30, 1943)] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
27. See id.
28. See infra text and accompanying notes 131-74.
29. See Teletype, FBI El Paso, supra note 25.
30. See id.
31. Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Francis Biddle, Attorney
General (Oct. 23, 1943) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
32. Id.
20041 1765
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B. The "Japanazi Romance"
Haider and Loescher were searched when they were arrested,
and the search turned up some of the ordinary tools of escape-road
maps of New Mexico and Arizona, and about twelve dollars in
change.33 But something a good deal stranger emerged from their
pockets as well. They had photographs of themselves in various poses
with several young women.34 Some of the poses looked just friendly,
but one of them looked downright amorous: it showed the prisoner
Haider with his arms around one of the young women, their lips
locked in a passionate kiss. Most importantly, as it would turn out,
the women all looked Japanese.
At first, the photographs seemed little more than a curiosity to
the state and federal law enforcement officers who were interrogating
Haider and Loescher.35 The police chief of Las Vegas, New Mexico,
decided to keep them as souvenirs, and he showed them around to his
friends.36 One of his friends, however, showed them to the editor of
the local newspaper, and he, in turn, gave them to the Denver Post.37
On Sunday, October 24, 1943, the Post ran three of the photographs
on the front page under the headline "German Prisoners Spooned
with Jap Girls in Trinidad."38 The Associated Press then picked up
the photos, and within days the story of the "Japanazi Romances"
was in newspapers across the country.39  The military's
embarrassment mounted.
The publication of the photographs led the FBI to send an agent
from its Denver office to question the Germans further. After
extensive questioning, Heinrich Haider finally admitted that a few
weeks earlier he had met several Japanese-American women on a
farm where he and other war prisoners had been harvesting onions,
that he had gone into the house where the Japanese-American
women lived, that he had asked them for civilian clothes, and that one
33. See Letter from D.A. Bryce, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Nov. 4, 1943) (on





38. See German Prisoners Spooned with Jap Girls in Trinidad, DENVER POST, Oct. 24,
1943, at 1.
39. See Japanazi Romances-The Fair Play Role in Love and War, WASH. TIMES-
HERALD, Nov. 1, 1943; FBI Grills 5 Jap Women About Photos with German Prisoners,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR J., Oct. 28, 1943, at 19,
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of them had responded, "We will see."40 Three days later, Haider
said, several of the women passed by on the farm, and one of them-
he could not say which-had said, "there is something for you ... in
the bushes."41  Haider checked and found a package with civilian
clothing in it.
42
The women to whom Haider referred were sisters, all of them
with the maiden name Shitara. As was fairly common among the
children of early twentieth-century Japanese immigrants, the Shitara
sisters had Japanese surnames, but they went by Anglo nicknames-
Toots, Flo, and Billie.43 The Shitara sisters had grown up on a farm in
Inglewood, California, but had never lived among other Japanese
Americans, and as a result, even their earliest memories were tinged
with prejudice and discrimination. 44 They were ostracized and had
few friends.45  Neighborhood children called them "slant-eye" and
"skibby."46  In 1922, they huddled together praying in the fields
behind their home while hooded members of the Ku Klux Klan
raided their neighborhood.47  Even law enforcement victimized the
family: a police officer found one of the sisters home alone when she
was ten and tried to rape her.48
Their experiences as adults were no less bitter. Each of them
married, but, flaunting the conventions of the times, two married
across racial lines,49 which subjected them to scorn. At the time of the
40. See FBI REPORT (Oct. 30, 1943), supra note 26, at 12.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See German's Testimony Stuns Treason Trial Court, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver,
CO), Aug. 8, 1944, at 5.
44. Interview with Misao Billie Tanigoshi, at 6 (Sept. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Tanigoshi
Interview] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 11.
47. See id. at 5-6. In a particularly violent confrontation that took place next door to
the Shitara home, a Klansman was shot. See id. When his hood was removed, people saw
that the Klansman was a local police officer. See id. at 5; see also DAVID M. CHALMERS,
HOODED AMERICANISM: THE FIRST CENTURY OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN 119-22 (1965)
(describing the Inglewood KKK raid); THE INGLEWOOD RAIDERS: STORY OF THE
CELEBRATED Ku KLUX CASE AT Los ANGELES AND SPEECHES TO THE JURY (1923)
(same); Cecilia Rasmussen, Klan's Tentacles Once Extended to Southland, L.A. TIMES,
May 30, 1999, at B3 (same).
48. See Tanigoshi Interview, supra note 44, at 37-38.
49. Tsuruko "Toots" Shitara married a white man named Virgil Wallace. See
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI REPORT 29 (Nov. 9. 1943) [hereinafter FBI
REPORT (Nov. 9, 1943)]. Misao "Billie" Shitara married William Tanigoshi, whose father
was Japanese and whose mother was white. See Tanigoshi Interview, supra note 44, at 12-
13. Another Shitara sister, Lily, married an African American. See FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, FBI REPORT 2 (July 7, 1944). Yet another, Kazumi, married a
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attack on Pearl Harbor, the two older sisters, Toots and Flo, lived on
Terminal Island near Los Angeles," which was the first location along
the West Coast from which Japanese Americans were evicted in
February of 1942.51 They were given just days to clear out.5 2 In the
spring of 1942, the entire Shitara family was ordered to report to the
assembly center at the Santa Anita racetrack, and many of them spent
that summer living in the horse stables.53 In the fall of 1942, they
were all put on a train with darkened windows and transported for
indefinite incarceration in the custody of the federal War Relocation
Authority at the Amache Relocation Center on the wind-swept
prairie of southeastern Colorado. 4 Less than a year later, in the late
spring of 1943, the sisters were granted leave from Amache to live as
laborers on an onion farm.55 All three of the sisters, however, went to
the farm without their husbands: Toots's husband, who was white,
remained on Terminal Island, working in a cannery;5 6 Flo's husband
had left Amache to serve in the army;57 and Billie's husband had left
camp for a job in Cleveland in order to support her and their young
daughter.58
Following up on Heinrich Haider's story, FBI agents questioned
the Shitara sisters about the German war prisoners' escape, but each
of them denied knowing anything about it.59 They admitted that Flo
had taken the photographs on the farm early in October and that they
had given the photographs to the Germans as souvenirs, but
claimed-falsely-that they had given the Germans no clothing and
had never talked with them about an escape.6°
While the FBI and the local United States Attorney tried to
Korean American. See FBI REPORT (Nov. 9, 1943), supra, at 26.
50. See Tanigoshi Interview, supra note 44, at 12.
51. See ROGER DANIELS, PRISONERS WITHOUT TRIAL 50 (1993).
52. See Tanigoshi Interview, supra note 44, at 12.
53. See id. at 13-14.
54. See id. at 14-15. Amache was also known as the Granada Relocation Center. See
J. BURTON ET AL., CONFINEMENT AND ETHNICITY: AN OVERVIEW OF WORLD WAR II
JAPANESE AMERICAN RELOCATION SITES, Ch. 5, available at http://www.cr.nps.gov/
history/online books/anthropology74/ce5.htm (last modified Sept. 1, 2000) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
55. See FBI REPORT (Nov. 9, 1943), supra note 49, at 26.
56. See FBI REPORT (Oct. 30, 1943), supra note 26, at 17. Under California's anti-
miscengenation law at the time, this marriage was actually illegal. See Hrishi Karthikeyan
& Gabriel J. Chin, Preserving Racial Identity: Population Patterns and the Application of
Anti-Miscegenation Statutes to Asian Americans, 1910-1950, 9 ASIAN L.J. 1, 17 (2002).
57. See FBI REPORT (Oct. 30, 1943), supra note 26, at 15.
58. See id. at 18.




figure out what to do with the Shitara sisters, the War Relocation
Authority weighed in with a report on the Shitara family.61 James
Lindley, the director of the Amache Relocation Center, knew the
Shitara family from the months the family had spent at the camp, and
while he conceded that the sisters were "a bit on the wild side," he
stated confidently that there was "[no]thing subversive or disloyal
about this family. '62 "I believe," Lindley reported, "that the girls
were having a bit of fun and taking their pleasure where they found
it."63 He pointed the finger of blame directly at the military: "As it is
my understanding that these prisoners work under guard, I should
think the guards would be able to give an explanation as to how and
why this apparently loose conduct was countenanced."'
C. The Stool Pigeon and the Tunnel
On November 5, 1943, almost three weeks after the Germans
were captured and almost two weeks after the photographs appeared
in the nation's newspapers, Attorney General Francis Biddle
reviewed the file on the Shitara sisters and did not see much that
concerned him.65 A note to Tom C. Clark, the Chief of the Justice
Department's Criminal Division,' explained that although Biddle
was prepared to defer to Clark's judgment, he felt, "at first blush, that
there is probably no violation here."67 Biddle preferred that the case
be closed with a simple deal: the sisters "would be returned to the
relocation center on the agreement that no action be taken-or the
like."68 Clark, however, was suspicious. On the back of the Attorney
General's memo he scribbled his own note to James Mclnerney, the
lawyer who headed the Criminal Division's National Defense Section:
"I bet 30¢ these Jap gals did get the clothes and help these boys
escape. I think a thorough investigation should be made."69




65. Memorandum from Francis Biddle, Attorney General, to T.C. Clark, Assistant
Attorney General (Nov. 5, 1943) [hereinafter Biddle Memorandum] (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
66. Clark would go on to serve as an Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
from 1949 to 1967. See Members of the Supreme Court, 1789 to Present, at
www.supremecourt.us.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2004) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
67. See Biddle Memorandum, supra note 65.
68. Id.
69. Note from T.C. Clark, Assistant Attorney General, to James Mclnerney,
Assistant Attorney General (undated) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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As it happened, the investigation in Colorado was ongoing even
as Clark was writing his comment about the "Jap gals." And it was
turning up something extraordinary: another of the six escapees from
Camp Trinidad, Julio E. Hofmann, had begun cooperating with
military and law enforcement authorities.7" On November 3, two days
before the Attorney General recommended against prosecuting the
Shitara sisters, Hofmann approached officials at Camp Trinidad and
dangled before them some valuable information both about the
escape of Haider and Loescher and about security at Camp
Trinidad.71 He said, however, that he would share his information
only for a price.72 He wanted, first, for the military to move him to a
different prison camp.7" Second, he wanted the FBI to intercede on
his behalf to prevent him from being sent back to Germany at the
war's end.74 He explained that he was a Chilean national of German
parentage who had gotten caught in Germany at the start of the war
and forced by the Gestapo into the German Air Corps over his bitter
objection.75 The FBI and the military promised to meet the first of his
demands76 and promised to try to help with the second.77 With that,
Hofmann started to talk.
Hofmann first revealed to the authorities that as early as mid-
August of 1943, the prisoners at Camp Trinidad had managed to dig a
one-hundred-fifty-foot-long, five-foot-deep, thirty-inch-wide tunnel
from beneath the officers' compound all the way to a point sixty-five
feet beyond the perimeter fence.78 Even more astonishing, the tunnel
was braced with lumber and fitted with electric lighting.79 Hofmann
said that he had told guards at Camp Trinidad about the tunnel
months earlier, but that they had done nothing about it."0 A search of
the grounds at Camp Trinidad revealed a tunnel exactly where
Hofmann said it would be.8' This was yet another major




74. See Letter from G.A. Nicholson, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (Nov. 9, 1943)




78. See Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to Francis Biddle,
Attorney General (Nov. 17, 1943) [hereinafter Hoover Memorandum] (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
79. See Nicholson Letter, supra note 74.




embarrassment for the military. The FBI instructed Camp Trinidad's
commander not to say a word in public about the tunnel, so as not to
compromise either the camp's security or the FBI's investigation.
82
The commander, grasping at the chance to deflect some criticism for
the thirteen escapes that had happened on his watch, defied the FBI's
instructions and immediately gave an extensive interview to the press
in which he took credit for discovering the tunnel after "an
investigation [that] ha[d] been in progress for some time."83 The
commander boasted that his supposed "discovery" of the tunnel had
"frustrated the esape of a large number of Germans."'
This bogus "discovery" undoubtedly went a small way toward
polishing the military's severely tarnished security record at its POW
camps. But Hofmann offered the government an even more tempting
target for this purpose-the three Shitara sisters. He told the FBI
that once he got back to Camp Trinidad after being recaptured, he
struck up a friendship with Heinrich Haider and asked Haider about
his escape. Haider tried to maintain that he and Loescher had
hopped a freight train into New Mexico, but Hofmann insisted that
that was not possible.85 The next day, Hofmann said, Haider softened
and opened up to him about "the Jap girls." Hofmann's statement is
worth quoting at length:
I ask him if he f with the Jap girls and he said "In the car
it was very warm with the Jap girls".... Haider was sitting in
front with the Jap girl Toots and he said Loescher was in back
with a girl I think he said Billie... I do not know if Flo was
there.... Also before he escaped he told me he had clothes
from the Jap girls. He said these were civil [sic] clothes. After I
returned to camp he told me that the Jap girls came on the
street with the car with no lights and he and Loescher went in
the car with them.... He said he had $14.00 from the Jap
girls.86
Hofmann then volunteered proof of the Shitara sisters' intent,
with a detail or two about the drive to New Mexico that no witness
would later confirm or even mention, either before or during the
sisters' eventual trial:
82. See id.
83. Escape Tunnel Found at War Prisoners' Camp at Trinidad, DENVER POST, Nov. 8,
1943, at 1.
84. Id.
85. FBI REPORT (Nov. 9, 1943), supra note 49, at 14-15.
86. See id.
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Haider said the Jap girls told him their father had a farm in
California but that their father has not given this farm to
America but they took it from him. She said that American
papers said German soldiers were not good but that she saw
Haider and knew Germans were good. She said she thought
Germans were barbarious but after she met Haider she knew
this was not true.
8 7
This was the story that Julio Hofmann told so that he might be
removed from Camp Trinidad and not returned to Germany at war's
end. His gambit worked. A few days after making his statement,
Hofmann was transferred to Camp McCain, Mississippi.8 When his
fellow German prisoners were sent back to Germany, Hofmann was
allowed to go to Chile. 9 After spending a number of years there as a
commercial pilot, he immigrated to the United States and settled in
the Miami area,9° where he recently died.91  Obviously, Julio
Hofmann talked his way to a better life.
D. Turning Romance to Treason
Armed with Hofmann's allegations, an FBI agent questioned
Heinrich Haider again.92 Seeing that it would be impossible to
conceal the sisters' role, Haider began to talk about Toots, Flo, and
Billie.93 He explained that he had met them on the onion farm early
in October, told them of his desire to escape, and asked them to help
by giving him civilian clothing.94 The women tried to dissuade him
from escaping.95 They argued that it was foolish because the war
would be over soon and the chances were high that he would be
caught.96 Haider said that the women also maintained that he would
never be able to make it to Germany, but he told them he just wanted
to go to Los Angeles.97 In any event, the women said, they could not
87. Id.
88. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI REPORT 9 (Dec. 10, 1943)
[hereinafter FBI REPORT (Dec. 10, 1943)] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
89. See Prisoner of War Information Bureau Form No. 6 (Julio Edwin Hofmann)
Deutsche Dienstelle (WAST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
90. Telephone Interview with Julio E. Hofmann (Mar. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Hofmann
Interview] (notes on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
91. See Obituaries, MIAMI HERALD, July 31, 2003, at 4B.








help him because they had no money."
He talked with the women over the next few days and reiterated
his intent to escape.99 Finally, some ten days after he first asked for
the women's help, they left a package of civilian clothing for him in
one of the onion fields. 1°° Emboldened by this first offer, Haider sent
a note to them announcing that he and Loescher would be escaping
on Saturday, October 16th. 1' 1 Toots responded, also by note, with an
offer to pick them up on the highway outside the camp that evening
and drive them south.1°2
On the appointed evening, Haider explained to the FBI, he and
Loescher cut their way through the fence at Camp Trinidad and made
their way to a nearby highway. °3 After a while, Toots, Billie, and Flo
pulled up in a big Buick and dimmed their headlightsY°4 Toots was at
the wheel. Haider and Loescher got in the car and they drove south
into New Mexico. l"5 At around 1:30 in the morning, the car
developed water pump trouble, so the women left the two Germans
by the side of the road with the civilian clothing, the road maps, and,
fatefully, the photographs. 1°6
Interestingly, the interrogating agent did not pursue Hofmann's
claim about the women's dissatisfactions with the United States and
their admiration for Germany. In fact, only one element in Haider's
new story even implied anything about the women's intent in helping
them, and that element pointed toward innocence, not guilt, of
treason:
HAIDER admitted that he had had intimate relations with
subject [TOOTS] in the car during this trip but asked that no
mention be made of this matter in public or in any trial of the
case. He stated that he would give his word he would testify to
the above facts which he stated are the truth but asked that if
possible no mention be made of his having had intimate
relations with [TOOTS]."0





102. See FBI REPORT (Dec. 10, 1943), supra note 88, at. 8.
103. See FBI REPORT (Nov. 9, 1943), supra note 49, at 18.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.; FBI REPORT (Dec. 10, 1943), supra note 88, at 8.
107. See FBI REPORT (Nov. 9, 1943), supra note 49, at 19.
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the attention of the United States Attorney.0 8
The interrogating agent now had a story implicating Toots, Flo,
and Billie in a plot to help the prisoners. So eager was he to
corroborate it that he immediately did something that was either
extraordinarily unprofessional or downright malicious: he brought
Loescher into the interrogation room and-with Haider sitting right
there-told Loescher the whole story that Haider had just told him."
He then asked Loescher to confirm that the story was true, and
Loescher did. Naturally this interrogation technique did nothing but
let Loescher know exactly what he needed to say in order to conform
his story to Haider's-a convenient strategy for preparing a treason
case, which requires proof of an overt act by two witnesses."0
Loescher then sat down with the agent to tell his story and, of
course, it matched Haider's factual account precisely.1 ' Loescher
repeatedly emphasized that the women were not willing participants
in the episode and that he and Haider had "had to urge the girls with
every argument at their command to convince them that the plan
could be successful.""' 2  Loescher also admitted to "having had
intimate relations with BILLIE," and asked "that this matter not be
made public and that no mention of it be made in court.""' 3 The
agent assured Loescher, as he had assured Haider, that he would
bring the request to the attention of the United States Attorney."
4
The agent did ask Loescher one question that he had not asked
Haider: "whether the affair was a romantic escapade on the part of
the Japanese girls.""' 5  Given the photographs, the women's
reluctance, the Germans' efforts at persuasion, and the sex in the car,
this was certainly a reasonable question. But Loescher told the agent
that he was "convinced that they did it to help Germany."116 How did
Loescher know this? He said that "the girls are definitely Japanese
and probably have not been accepted by Americans and he knows
108. See id.
109. A lawyer in the Justice Department, reviewing the FBI report's description of this
exchange, was so shocked by the agent's technique that he marked the passage and then
scrawled in the margin "What a Dope!" See FBI REPORT (Nov. 9, 1943), supra note 49, at
19.
110. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 ("No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.").








that they feel allegiance to Japan and to its ally Germany."117 That is,
he did not tell the agent anything that any of the women actually said
or did; he simply ventured his opinion that the American citizens who
helped him were "definitely Japanese" who "probably" felt like
outsiders."8 The agent asked Loescher whether he was willing to
testify to that at a trial, and Loescher said that he would, "see[ing] no
reason to deny the truth." 9
Loescher's conscience, however, must have been nagging at him,
because at the end of his interrogation, he asked for permission to
send a letter to the judge who would try the case against the Shitara
sisters.2 0 His letter is worth quoting at length because of the light it
sheds on the sisters' intent:
Sir! As you now have got my statement I profit by the
opportunity to give the following to your notice: When my
comrade Haider spoke to the two Japanese women (Toots and
Billie) for the first time about our escape plans they both
objected vividly. "There is no good in escaping for you", they
said. "Wait for the war's end; be patient; keep your health;
don't play with your life," was their advice. They pointed out a
lot of dangers and circumstances making a flight nearly
impossible. But being regardless resolved to realize the
escapade we tried to persuade the women. We had to take
many troubles by words and by letters to change their mind.
Finally we succeeded. I think it therefore reasonable to
consider us the more guilty party, not the seduced women.
Without our urgent persuasions they never would have
agreed.2'
At the time Loescher wrote this letter, the sisters were charged
with nothing. Indeed, the day that Loescher wrote his letter to Judge
Symes was the same day that Attorney General Francis Biddle shared
his view with Tom Clark that there was probably nothing to the
case.122 But with Haider's and Loescher's statements, the Justice
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. FBI REPORT (Nov. 9, 1943), supra note 49, at 20. A different, and far likelier
version of the truth was circulating in the rumor mill at Camp Trinidad. A German officer
related to the FBI that "he had gathered the impression from conversation among officers
that the entire affair was in the nature of a romantic weekend and that he understood the
girls to be in love with the German Prisoners of War." See FBI REPORT (Dec. 10, 1943),
supra note 88, at 11.
120. See FBI REPORT (Nov. 9, 1943), supra note 49, at 18.
121. See Letter from Hermann Loescher, German Prisoner of War, to J. Foster Symes,
United States District Judge (Nov. 5, 1943) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
122. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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Department now had three faces-Japanese faces-on which to pin
responsibility for the embarrassing security problems at Camp
Trinidad. That was the day that the treason prosecution of the
Shitara sisters began in earnest.
E. Criminal Intent Vanishes on the Road to Trial
It was also the last day that anyone in the government gave more
than fleeting thought to what the actual intent of the Shitara sisters
might have been. In order to prove the sisters guilty of treason, the
government would have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that in
helping Haider and Loescher escape from Camp Trinidad, they
intended to give aid and comfort to an enemy of the United States.
12 3
In late 1943 and early 1944, the law was clear that a person who helps
an enemy of the United States must intend more than to help an
individual; she must intend for her help to injure the United States or
124 Ta sassist the enemy's cause. That is, she must not merely "play the
part of a traitor"; she must also be a "traitor at heart.'
125
Six months would pass between the day when Haider and
Loescher implicated Toots, Flo, and Billie in their escape and the day
when a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging them with
treason. Those six months were filled with bitter intra-governmental
squabbling over the case-between the Justice Department's
Criminal Division and the FBI,126 between the Justice Department
and the State Department, 27 and between the Justice Department
123. See United States v. Stephan, 133 F.2d 87, 92 (6th Cir. 1943) ("Although not
explicitly set forth in either the constitutional or statutory provisions, an intent to give aid
and comfort to the enemy is an essential element of the crime of treason.").
124. See Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 641-42 (1947) (recognizing a distinction
between acts intended to assist a person and acts intended to advance an enemy's cause);
United States v. Fricke, 259 F. 673, 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). The Fricke court stated:
If not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's intention and
purpose in acting as he did was evil-that is, if not satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that he intended to aid and comfort the enemies of the United States-
and if not satisfied that that was his object, the defendant must be found not
guilty.
Fricke, 259 F. at 676.
125. United States v. Werner, 247 F. 708, 709-10 (E.D. Pa. 1918).
126. This was a battle primarily over who would receive public credit for handling the
case. The Criminal Division, for its part, wanted control over the case, insisting that it was
"one of the best publicity cases [the] division ha[d] ever had." See Memorandum from
J.K. Mumford, to D.M. Ladd, Assistant Director, FBI (Dec. 8, 1943) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). The FBI, on the other hand, very much wanted the public
to see the FBI's involvement in the case at every step-especially the most visible step, the
sisters' arrest. See Memorandum from L.B. Nichols, Assistant Director, FBI to C. Tolson,
Associate Director, FBI (May 10, 1944) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
127. This resulted from a request by the State Department to postpone the trial
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and the War Relocation Authority.'28 But in the midst of it all, as
prosecutors and the FBI prepared the case for trial, the issue of the
Shitara sisters' intent simply vanished.
On December 4, 1943, Tom Clark wrote to J. Edgar Hoover that
the Justice Department's Criminal Division needed additional
information before making a final decision about a treason
prosecution. 129 He listed fourteen inquiries, both general and specific,
that he wanted the FBI to undertake. Only one specific inquiry had
anything to do with intent: Clark wanted to know whether Haider
had told the women "that he wanted to get back to Germany to fight
again."'13 0
Hoover responded on January 6, 1944.131 Upon further
questioning, Haider had made clear that he never told Toots, Flo, and
Billie that he wanted to go back to Germany to fight. 3 2 Instead, he
told them that he "planned to go to Mexico, from there to South
America[], and probably to Chile," where he hoped he might meet
indefinitely so as not to complicate its efforts at trading Japanese nationals in the United
States for American nationals in Japan. See Letter from T.C. Clark, Assistant Attorney
General, to Cordell Hull, Secretary of State (Mar. 9, 1944) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
128. Struggles between the Justice Department and the War Relocation Authority first
arose when suspicion fell on the Shitara sisters. The Justice Department wanted the
sisters returned to the security of the Amache Relocation Center, but the War Relocation
Authority did not want them in camp, mixing with the other internees. See Memorandum
from D.M. Ladd, Assistant Director, FBI, to E.A. Tamm, Assistant Director, FBI (Nov. 9,
1943) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Memorandum from J.K. Mumford to
D.M. Ladd, Assistant Director, FBI (Nov. 8 1943) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The second conflict came in May of 1944, when the Justice Department
announced the indictment of the Shitara sisters. The War Relocation Authority was, at
that time, trying to persuade the military to reopen the West Coast states to Japanese
Americans, and its leaders feared that a treason indictment against Japanese Americans
would upset that effort. See Memorandum from E.J. Ennis, Head of the Alien Enemy
Control Unit, to Francis Biddle, Attorney General (May 11, 1944) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). Ennis stated:
Both Abe Fortas and Dillon Myer called me yesterday about the possibilities
of adjourning the breaking of this case in view of the current important
administrative plans for Japanese-Americans in the West.... I recommend
that in the interest of the whole program the trial be adjourned and the risk of
sensational press treatment be avoided so far as possible at this crucial point
in the Japanese relocation program.
See id
129. See Memorandum from T.C. Clark, Assistant Attorney General, to J. Edgar
Hoover, Director, FBI, (Dec. 4, 1943) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
130. Id.
131. See Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to T.C. Clark, Assistant
Attorney General (Jan. 6, 1944) (on file with North Carolina Law Review).
132. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI REPORT 2 (Dec. 28, 1943)
[hereinafter FBI REPORT (Dec. 28, 1943)].
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some of Julio Hofmann's relatives.'33 Haider also said he had
mentioned the possibility of going to California. 134 Loescher, for his
part, said that he had told the women that he "hoped to obtain work,"
but had never told them that he "hoped to return to Germany and
again enter the fight.'
135
At about the same time, obviously in anticipation of a trial in the
case, the FBI case agent filed a Summary Report in which he listed
the likely government witnesses, summarized their likely testimony,
and listed the trial subpoenas that should issue.13 6 The agent's review
of Haider's expected testimony did not include a single word about
the women's intent. 137 And Loescher, the agent wrote, would testify
only "that he is convinced the girls assisted in the escape not entirely
from a romantic motive but actually believing they were helping
Germany against this country.' 1 38 This was a far cry from Loescher's
original statement in early November that he was "convinced they did
it to help Germany" and knew their allegiance was to Japan.
39
In mid-February of 1944, Assistant Attorney General Tom Clark
was finally ready to ask the Attorney General for permission to file
treason charges against the Shitara sisters. 40 He gave Biddle a two-
page synopsis of the evidence. 14  It detailed the chronology of the
events, specified the overt acts that the government thought it could
prove, and briefly summarized which witnesses could testify to which
acts.142 Clark included not a whit of evidence of the sisters' criminal
intent, though he speculated that "[i]t would have been possible for
the escaping prisoners to have committed acts of sabotage such as
train wrecking or destroying a bridge or other strategic locations after
the escape had been made."'43  "I do not believe," he told the
Attorney General, "that we can assume that these women did not
contemplate such actions by the prisoners when they assisted them in
133. See id.
134. See id. at 3.
135. Id.
136. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI REPORT (Jan. 1, 1944)
[hereinafter FBI REPORT (Jan. 1, 1944)] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
137. Id. at 3.
138. See id.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17.
140. See Memorandum from T.C. Clark, Assistant Attorney General, to Francis
Biddle, Attorney General (Feb. 17, 1944) [hereinafter Memorandum from Clark (Feb. 17,
1944)] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. FBI REPORT (Dec. 28, 1943), supra note 132, at 2.
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making their escape."144 And then Clark volunteered the larger
agenda that was driving the prosecution: "I believe that prosecution
in this case will serve to discourage other persons from rendering
assistance to prisoners of war.' 1 45 "This factor is extremely important
in view of ... the fact that a number of the[m] have escaped from
custody within the past few months.1 46
Clark could not have summarized the case more accurately.
Apart from the unadorned fact that the woman offered help to
prisoners who were German, the government had no proof of
treasonous intent.'47 Indeed, its proof tended to show innocence.
Yet, the government was going to ask a jury to find intent beyond a
reasonable doubt on the basis of an assumption. Furthermore, the
government was planning to charge the three women with the capital
offense of treason in order deflect attention from the military's share
of the blame for the escapes of prisoners it was supposed to be
guarding.
The Attorney General authorized prosecution of Toots, Flo, and
Billie on March 2, 1944.148 A federal grand jury sitting in Denver
indicted them on May 9, 1944, for treason and conspiracy to commit
treason.149 The indictment specified four overt treasonous acts: two
acts of providing road maps to the prisoners, one act of notifying the
Germans that the civilian clothing was waiting for them in the onion
field, and one act of driving the Germans south into New Mexico. 5 °
On the day the indictment was returned, an agent from the United
States Marshals Service went to their barracks at the Amache
Relocation Center and placed them under arrest. 5' He drove them to
Denver and deposited them in a county jail to await trial.
152
144. Id.
145. Id. at 3.
146. Id. at 3.
147. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
148. See Memorandum from Clark (Feb. 17, 1944), supra note 140, at 1 (handwritten
note on cover page).
149. See Indictment at 2, United States v. Wallace (D. Colo. May 9, 1944) (No. 10387)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
150. See id.
151. The FBI argued for the right to make the arrest, but when the Justice Department
would not agree to displacing the Marshals Service, the FBI relented. "[I]t would look
ridiculous for our office and the Marshals Office to apprehend three girls," said a top FBI
official. Memorandum from R.H. Cunningham, to D.M. Ladd, Assistant Director, FBI
(May 5, 1944) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
152. See Teletype, FBI Denver, to J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI (May 10, 1944) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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F "Benedict Arnolds in Skirts"
Trial began on Monday, August 7, 1944, in the courtroom of
Federal District Judge J. Foster Symes, the only United States
District Judge for the District of Colorado.'53 Symes was a veteran of
World War I and a twenty-two year veteran of the federal bench, with
a reputation of being stern but fair.154  The defense attorney,
appointed by Judge Symes and serving without compensation, was
Kenneth Robinson, universally respected at the Denver bar as one of
the best trial lawyers in the city.1'5 The prosecutor was Colorado's
United States Attorney, Thomas Morrissey, aided by an Assistant
U.S. Attorney named Ivor Wingren, who had been Judge Symes's law
partner in the early 1920s before Symes became a judge. 56
Judge Symes quickly seated a jury of twelve men and an
alternate, excusing for cause only one potential juror who announced
on voir dire that he "didn't like Japanese," as well as a handful of
others who had relatives in the service in the Pacific Theater.1
57
Because the sisters never filed an appeal, there is no surviving
transcript of trial testimony. But the trial was one of the most
dramatic of World War II, and lengthy newspaper accounts make it
fairly easy to reconstruct the proceedings. 158  To the eyes of the
reporters who covered it, the trial was scrupulously fair-"a
remarkable demonstration of American justice," in the words of the
Denver Post.59 In hindsight, this is not so clear. The prosecutors
decided to honor the German soldiers' request not to reveal their
sexual intimacies with the sisters, 16" which meant that the prosecutors
suppressed the most powerful evidence of the sisters' innocent intent.
Also suppressed-not just by the prosecutor, but by Judge Symes
himself-was Loescher's letter to the judge explaining how hard it
had been to persuade "the seduced women" to help him and Haider
153. See James L. Treece et al., John Foster Symes, 19 THE COLORADO LAWYER 1284,
1285 (1990).
154. See id.; Lee Casey, 27 Years of Fine Service, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, CO),
Sept. 21, 1949, at 25; Interview with Robert Swanson, Esq., in Denver, Co. (Dec. 1, 2000),
at 3 [hereinafter Swanson Interview] (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
155. See Swanson Interview, supra note 154, at 2-3.
156. See J. Foster Symes Retires as Federal Judge, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, CO),
Sept. 21, 1949.
157. See German's Testimony Stuns Treason Trial Court, supra note 43.
158. Sketchy notes in the judge's handwriting can be found in the case file in the
National Archives. See United States v. Wallace (D.Colo. May 9, 1944) (No. 10387) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
159. Editorial, That's That, DENVER POST, Aug. 12, 1944, at 2.
160. See Jack Foster, 2d Nazi Describes Aid by U.S.-Jap Girls, ROCKY MTN. NEWS,
(Denver, CO), Aug. 9, 1944, at 5.
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escape.6 In these ways, the case that ultimately went to the jury was
racked with reversible error.
162
The government's case took just two days to present, and
consisted primarily of the constitutionally required two eyewitnesses
to the overt acts of treason charged in the indictment. Those
eyewitness-the eyewitnesses on whose word Toots, Flo, and Billie
stood to be convicted-were the two German soldiers they had aided,
Heinrich Haider and Hermann Loescher. But just as their stories had
changed repeatedly between their arrests and their various pre-trial
interrogations, their stories changed again at trial. And they changed
dramatically.
Haider was the first of the two to testify. 63  The prosecutor
asserted in his opening statement that Haider and Loescher would
testify that they had told the sisters that they wanted to escape in
order to return to Germany and rejoin the fight against the Allies."6
It is not clear why the prosecutor ventured that prediction; the
investigative files reveal that neither of the soldiers had ever actually
said that to an investigator in the case. But to the astonishment of
everyone in the courtroom, Heinrich Haider vividly disputed the
prosecutor's prediction.'65 "I object to the [prosecutor's] statement
that I escaped from the Trinidad prison camp so that I might go back
and fight for Germany,""6 Haider volunteered on direct examination.
"I escaped so that I might join the Austrian or Czechoslovakian
Legion and fight against the Hitler gang."' 67  Haider, an Austrian,
explained that he had publicly opposed Hitler's annexation of his
country in 1938, and, for his outspokenness, he had been sent to a
concentration camp in Bavaria for two years and then impressed into
military service.' As an anti-Nazi at Camp Trinidad, he explained,
he was victimized by pro-Nazi prisoners; thus, he said, he "told Toots
161. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
162. This is unquestionably so under today's law, which condemns the suppression of
material exculpatory and impeachment evidence as a violation of the defendant's due
process rights. See generally Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). It was also most likely true even under the law in 1944. See
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942) (condemning the knowing suppression of
"favorable evidence" by the prosecution).
163. Foster, supra note 160.
164. See German Says Japs Aided His Escape as Anti-Nazi, DENVER POST, Aug. 8,
1944, at 3. [hereinafter German Says Japs Aided His Escape].
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I wanted to escape because life there in the camp was unbearable."'69
His intended destination, he told the jury, had been South America.170
Not a single word that Haider spoke from the witness stand even
hinted that the sisters intended to help the enemy.
Hermann Loescher followed Haider to the witness stand. 1 ' His
testimony was a bit less stunning, but equally unhelpful to the
government's theory of treasonous intent. Loescher did not depict
himself as anti-Nazi, as Haider had done. But he made clear that his
days of fighting for Germany were behind him. He had been severely
wounded in battle in North Africa; "[s]hell splinters pierced [his]
lung," and he "was buried under a bombshell for four hours, and this
affected the joints of [his] hips and shoulders." '172 "I was wounded,"
Loescher explained, "and I could not fight again. I ha[d] no interest
in renewing the fight again. I just wanted my freedom." '173 Loescher,
who in one of his interrogations had claimed that he was "convinced
that [the sisters] did it to help Germany" and that he knew "the girls
[were] definitely Japanese and ... f[elt] allegiance to Japan and to its
ally Germany, ' 174 mentioned none of this from the witness stand.
And even though the prosecutor had the FBI report that contained
those earlier assertions, he permitted Loescher to leave the stand
without ever calling them to his attention.
The government called other witnesses to the stand in order to
establish other elements of the crime of treason;175 but, on the
element of intent, the testimony of the Germans was the entirety of
the government's case. And it amounted to nothing-not a single
word that tended to show that Toots, Flo, and Billie intended to
injure the United States or to advance the cause of Nazi Germany or
Imperial Japan. It is difficult to fathom how a case this thin survived
a defense motion for a directed verdict at the close of the
government's case, 176 but Judge Symes did deny the motion without
169. See German Says Japs Aided His Escape, supra note 164.
170. See German's Testimony Stuns Treason Trial Court, supra note 43.
171. Foster,.supra note 160.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 116-18.
175. See German Says Japs Aided his Escape, supra note 164.
176. The only way for the jurors to find an intent to aid the German Reich from the
evidence before them was to disregard all of it except for the simple fact that Haider and
Loescher were German soldiers. It was, of course, true in 1944 (and it remains so) that
criminal intent can be proven entirely through circumstantial evidence. See Estep v.
United States, 140 F.2d 40, 45 (10th Cir. 1943). But it was also the case in 1944 that
evidence of criminal intent had to be clear, not equivocal. See id. The government's proof
had to meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Minner v. United
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opinion. 77 Defense attorney Robinson then put on a case for the
sisters that included two character witnesses-white friends of the
Shitara family from California-who testified that the sisters were
loyal Americans.178 Toots, Flo, and Billie themselves declined to
testify, 7 9 which meant that the jury never heard any evidence directly
from them about their innocent intent. But it also meant that the jury
never heard any evidence from them that implied a culpable intent
either.
As absent as the issue of intent was from the evidentiary portion
of the trial, it was nearly as absent from prosecutor Ivor Wingren's
opening summation to the jury. What, after all, could he say? His
witnesses had not offered a word of testimony to show that Toots,
Flo, and Billie had intended to help the German Reich. Wingren
could argue only that it made no difference that Haider had described
himself as anti-Nazi and Loescher had said he would never fight
again. All that mattered, he said, was that the sisters knew the men
they were helping were German soldiers.18 "They're both citizens of
the German Reich," Wingren said, "and true to the German
Reich."'' That, in the government's view, was sufficient to establish
a capital crime.
Defense attorney Robinson then responded. He argued
powerfully to the jury that the case was about love, not treason. 182 His
clients, he said, were fools-fools who allowed their hearts to be
swept away by manipulative men. 83 He showed the jury the
photographs that had gotten the whole case started, and asked, "How
States, 57 F.2d 506, 512 (10th Cir. 1932). With all of the admitted evidence-to say
nothing of the evidence of intent that the government suppressed-tending to show that
the Shitara sisters did not intend to aid the Reich, a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of
criminal intent from the simple fact that the men were German soldiers was an
impossibility.
177. See Directed Verdict is Denied Jap Girls in Treason Trial, DENVER POST, Aug. 9,
1944, at 1.
178. See Jack Foster, Treason Trial Defense Closes; None of Jap-U.S. Sisters Testifies,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, (Denver, CO), Aug. 10, 1944, at 5.
179. A lawyer who assisted Robinson in the sisters' defense believes that they did not
testify because they never came to trust anyone--even their own lawyers-fully. See
Swanson interview, supra note 154, at 13-14. One of the sisters, however, remembers that
it was the lawyers who decided that they should not testify. See Tanigoshi interview, supra
note 44, at 23.
180. See Jap Girls' Fate Put Up to Jury As Treason Arguments End, DENVER POST,
Aug. 10, 1944, at 4 [hereinafter Jap Girls' Fate].
181. See Jack Foster, Denver Treason Trial Jury Returns a Sealed Verdict, ROCKY MTN.
NEWS (Denver, CO), Aug. 11, 1944, at 5.
182. See id.
183. See Jap Girls' Fate, supra note 180.
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far did this go? None has said. But it is indicated it went pretty
far. ' ' "M Playing off age-old gender stereotypes,'85 Robinson argued:
But what, gentlemen of the jury, does any woman do who finds
herself in this condition? Why, that heart of hers-that heart of
woman-that big heart of this woman foolishly responded and
unthinkingly she helped take him away. It is, I say, the old, old
story of woman. It is the old, old story of what a man can do to
a woman who likes him. For as it has been said, there are ...
four ... things that passeth understanding. They are the way of
the bird in the air, the way of the serpent upon the rock, the
way of a ship at sea-and the way of a man with a maid.'86
Robinson concluded in the same vein, conceding the women's
adultery but urging the jurors to see that it was not treason:
Oh, I know these women were married. I am not a judge of
morals-I have lived too long for that. But you know,
gentlemen, the way of a woman. I say to you, gentlemen,
"Frailty, thy name is woman." It was frailty that motivated
these women in whatever wrong they committed, and I do not
say to you they did not commit wrong. But they did not commit
treason. They did not act in "adherence to the government of
the German Reich.'
1 87
United States Attorney Thomas Morrissey gave the
government's rebuttal summation, and responded to Robinson's
intent-based defense. "Love-love! " shouted Morrissey. "Fie on
love! I say these women are traitors-traitors! I say fie on love and
fie on sympathy.' 18 8 The prosecutor then made explicit what until
then had only been implicit: "These were married women. If this be
American love, God help us-God help our democracy.
'189
Morrissey put a finer point on the argument moments later: "These
184. See id.
185. Kathleen Kennedy has shown how the government's framing of various sedition
charges during World War I derived from stereotyped understandings of femininity. See
KATHLEEN KENNEDY, DISLOYAL MOTHERS AND SCURRILOUS CITIZENS: WOMEN AND
SUBVERSION DURING WORLD WAR I passim (1999); Kathleen Kennedy, Manhood and
Subversion During World War I: The Cases of Eugene V. Debs and Alexander Berkman,
82 N.C. L. REV. 1653 passim (2004). At the trial of the Shitara sisters, the government and
the defense both deployed gender stereotypes, the defense to depict the women so swept
away by love as to be incapable of controlling their behavior or forming criminal intent,
and the government to depict the women as disabled by passion from forming loyalty of
any sort.






are traitors-little Benedict Arnolds in skirts. They were not true to
their husbands," Morrissey thundered, "nor, gentlemen of the jury,
were they true to the United States of America."' 19 The form of legal
argument here was familiar-the greater entails the lesser. But the
content of the argument was truly stunning: a wife who will betray
her husband is a woman who will betray her country.
And with that, the case went to the jury. The twelve men
deliberated on the sisters' fate for five and a half hours and then sent
out a question to Judge Symes: Did the charge of conspiracy to
commit treason require proof of the same intent as the charge of
treason itself?1 9 Judge Symes answered the question-correctly-in
the affirmative. 92 The jurors resumed deliberations for another two
and a half hours, and reached their verdict late that night. The next
morning, with Toots, Flo, Billie, and a courtroom full of spectators
and reporters on the edges of their chairs, the jury foreman read the
verdicts: not guilty of treason, but guilty of conspiracy to commit
treason.' 93
Judge Symes told the jurors he was satisfied with their verdict.194
But his words revealed the gaping hole at center of the case, and,
indeed, at the center even of the conspiracy conviction that the jury
had returned. "Personally, I think the verdict is a very fair one and a
proper one in this case," 195 the judge told the jurors in open court.
"After listening to all the evidence, I did not believe the defendants
had any intent to harm the United States or help the German
government.' 1 96 "For that reason," Symes concluded, "I had made up
my mind the defendants were not guilty of treason on the first
count."'" The judge's reasoning, however, did not make much sense
to the defendants. "How come they can find us guilty of conspiracy?"
asked Billie under her breath. "We didn't do that because we didn't
do treason.
1 98
Billie certainly had a point. If not flatly inconsistent, the jury's
verdicts were certainly in deep tension with each other. Some
190. Id.
191. See Note from Jury, United States v. Wallace (D. Colo. May 9, 1944) (No. 10387)
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
192. See Three Jap Girls Convicted of Plot to Commit Treason, DENVER POST, Aug.
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speculated that the verdict was a compromise, 199 and that may be true.
But given that both counts of the indictment-treason and
conspiracy-required proof of intent to betray the United States, and
given that there was no such evidence before the jury, it was a
compromise at the Shitara sisters' expense.
In light of Judge Symes's frank statement that he saw no
evidence of intent to betray the United States, he might have been
expected to grant defense counsel Robinson's motion for a new
trial.20 1 The absence of evidence of intent was the centerpiece of the
motion.2  But Symes denied it without comment.2 °3  And on the
same day, he sentenced Toots Wallace to a two-year sentence and a
$1,000 fine, and Flo and Billie to twenty-month sentences and $1,000
fines °.2  They served their time uneventfully, if sadly, at the federal
prison for women at Alderson, West Virginia,2  and returned to their
husbands and children on the West Coast in 1946.206
199. See Jack Foster, Three Jap-U.S. Sisters Convicted of Plotting Treason to Ask
Retrial, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, CO), Aug. 12, 1944, at 5.
200. Similarly, one might say that the acquittal on the substantive treason count was an
instance of jury leniency. That is, after all, one of the most common explanations for
inconsistent jury verdicts. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984) (noting that
inconsistent verdicts "often are a product of jury lenity"); Eric L. Muller, The Hobgoblin
of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent Verdicts, 111 HARV. L. REV. 771, 783-
86 (1998). But the verdicts in the treason trial of the Shitara sisters are actually a perfect
illustration that what appears to be jury leniency might actually be something considerably
darker. In the Hobgoblin article, I argued that an inconsistent verdict is not, as the courts
assume, necessarily an instance of jury leniency; it is rather an instance of jury discretion,
and that discretion can harm the defendant just as easily as it can harm the government.
See id. at 803-06. In other words, an inconsistent verdict might consist of a justified
conviction and an acquittal against the weight of the evidence, or it might consist of a
justified acquittal and a conviction against the weight of the evidence. The verdict in the
Shitara case must be an example of the latter: there was no evidence to support a
conviction on either count of the indictment, but the jury-undoubtedly wishing to punish
the sisters for their foolishness and their adultery-convicted them of conspiracy anyway.
201. Motion for New Trial, United States v. Wallace (D. Colo. May 9, 1944) (No.
10387) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
202. See id.
203. See Letter from Thomas J. Morrissey, United States Attorney for the District of
Colorado, to Francis Biddle, Attorney General (Aug. 21, 1944) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
204. See id.
205. The sisters decided against filing an appeal, wishing to get the whole episode
behind them. See Tanigoshi Interview, supra note 44, at 26.
206. See Letter from Tsuruko Wallace, to J. Foster Symes, United States District Judge
(Jan. 31, 1946) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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II. LAW, LOYALTY, AND THE "PERMANENT SOURCE OF MORAL
DANGER"
The treason trial of the Shitara sisters in 1944 is admittedly but
one episode in the American legal history of treason. 20 7  It is
dangerous to reach for broad conclusions about treason law from a
sample size of one.20 8 As it happens, however, the leading theoretical
work on law and loyalty identifies the precise dangers of error and
oppression that plagued the prosecution of the Shitara sisters. This
theoretical work has largely been done by two philosophers-Alisdair
Maclntyre and George P. Fletcher.
A. Alisdair Maclntyre: Loyalty as a Dangerous Moral Virtue
Alisdair MacIntyre provided a compelling account of loyalty in
his 1984 lecture Is Patriotism a Virtue?2°9 Maclntyre's specific
concern was the question of whether patriotism, not loyalty, is a moral
virtue, but MacIntyre located patriotism in "a class of loyalty-
exhibiting virtues ... other members of which are marital fidelity, the
love of one's own family and kin, friendship, and loyalty to such
institutions[] as schools and cricket or baseball clubs."210 Admittedly,
patriotism and national loyalty are not the same thing: patriotism
implies a degree of celebratory devotion that national loyalty does
not require.211 Still, Maclntyre's basic observations about the moral
status of patriotism are sufficiently general that they also apply to
national loyalty.
MacIntyre's most powerful insight is that loyalty can be a virtue
only in a moral framework that stands apart from the ordinary
framework of liberalism in which most Western moral theory resides.
The hallmarks of liberal moral theory, Maclntyre explains, are
impersonality, neutrality, and even-handedness.212  This is so
regardless of whether the liberal theory is utilitarian or Kantian. A
utilitarian says that the moral actor should treat another in the way
207. The leading legal history of treason in the United States is J. WILLARD HURST,
THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES (1971).
208. A fuller canvassing of the historiography of treason law might suggest additional
confirming examples. The most prominent would be the treason trial and conviction of
Iva Toguri d'Aquino, popularly known generally as "Tokyo Rose." See infra notes 266-71
and accompanying text.
209. Alasdair Maclntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue?, in PATRIOTISM 43-58 (Igor Primoratz
ed., 2002).
210. Id. at 44.
211. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF
RELATIONSHIPS 62-63 (1993).
212. Maclntyre, supra note 209, at 45-47.
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that produces the greatest good for the greatest number.213 A
Kantian says that the moral actor must treat a person consistently
with his uniquely human capacity for reason. n Both, however, insist
that the person making a moral judgment must do so dispassionately
and even-handedly. In neither moral framework does it matter
whether the actor's conduct affects his own child or a complete
stranger.
In the moral framework of loyalty, whether someone else is my
child or a stranger is decidedly relevant. Patriotism, MacIntyre
explains, "requires me to exhibit peculiar devotion to my nation and
you to yours. '215 Virtuous action in a framework of loyalty "requires
me to regard such contingent social facts as where I was born and
what government ruled over that place at that time, who my parents
were, who my great-great-grandparents were, and so on, as deciding
for me the question of what virtuous action is.'' 216 From this fact,
MacIntyre concludes-quite reasonably-that liberal and loyalty-
based moralities are "systematically incompatible.
217
Does this conflict between loyalty and liberal morality mean that
loyalty is a moral vice? Not at all, says MacIntyre. Morality is neither
a hard-wired feature of human neurology nor a free-floating agent
that we inhale at birth. It is, instead, something that we learn from
specific people and practice in a specific community.218 The definition
of the good life will therefore always have a local, particularized
inflection, as will the rules of how to behave in order to attain it.
More importantly, because it is hard for people to live morally, they
213. See John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REV. 275,
311-12 (1999) (giving an overview of utilitarianism).
214. See R. George Wright, Treating Persons As Ends in Themselves: The Legal
Implications of a Kantian Principle, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 271, 273-85 (2002) (giving an
overview of Kantian retributivism).
215. Maclntyre, supra note 209, at 45.
216. Id.
217. Id. Two cases substantiate this claim: cases of conflict between societies over
scarce resources needed by both (such as water needed by two desert nations), and cases
of conflict between societies over the right way to live (such as a clash over control of a
border region contested by both a conquering power and an indigenous people). In both
of these hard cases, Maclntyre contends, the liberal is obliged to be neutral and the patriot
to be partisan. See id. at 46-47. This is, however, a claim that others powerfully contest.
See Marcia Baron, Patriotism and "Liberal" Morality, in PATRIOTISM, supra note 209, at
59, 65-69 (arguing for an intermediate position that would allow the patriot to compare his
own society's needs with those of the other); Stephen Nathanson, In Defense of "Moderate
Patriotism," in PATRIOTISM, supra note 209, at 87, 92-95 (arguing for a form of "moderate
patriotism" in which those in one society take into account the humanity and well-being of
another).
218. See Maclntyre, supra note 209, at 48-49.
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need the support of others to keep them on the path, and that crucial
support will also be locally inflected.2 9 Thus, Maclntyre concludes,
"[i]t is in general only within a community that individuals become
capable of morality. '220 Deprived of a community, people are
"unlikely to flourish as ... moral agent[s]. ' '22 From this, MacIntyre
concludes that "allegiance to the community and what it requires of
me ... c[an] not meaningfully be contrasted with or counterposed to
what morality require[s] of me. '222 Loyalty is therefore not a vice, but
a "prerequisite for morality"-"not just [a] virtue[] but [a] central
virtue[] .223
That loyalty is a virtue does not mean it carries no risks.
Maclntyre concedes an important one-the risk of a certain kind of
blindness. He notes that loyalty to nation will sometimes require a
person to exempt it or one of its actions from criticism.224 Plainly
history has shown us many patriots who have opposed---even
violently-some set of their governments' policies. Loyalty thus
leaves space for robust criticism.225 But what is exempt from criticism,
Maclntyre argues, is "the nation conceived as a project."226 By this he
means "a particular way of linking a past which has conferred a
distinctive moral and political identity upon him or her with a future
.. which it is his or her responsibility to bring into being."227 Only to
the extent that a particular government or form of government
advances this national project is allegiance a virtue.
This means that there is a line that loyalty will not allow a person
to cross on behalf of his nation-a point where the particular agencies
of government have so defected from the nation's project that the
true moral traditions of the community will lead a citizen to abandon
allegiance to those agencies. But here is the rub: the very fact that
those agencies of government have emerged from the community that
transmits and shapes its citizens' loyalty will put those citizens in a
bad position to spot the defection.2 28 Loyalty will blind them to the
219. See id. at 49.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 50.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id. at 51-52.
225. This is the central point that is lost on pundit Ann Coulter, whose tragically
bestselling book TREASON equates membership in the Democratic Party with betrayal of
the United States. See ANN COULTER, TREASON passim (2003).
226. Maclntyre, supra note 209, at 52.
227. Id. at 53.
228. See id. at 54.
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government's violation of the national project. More often than not,
they will just miss it. And so, concludes Maclntyre, national loyalty
turns out to be not just a virtue, but also "a permanent source of
moral danger. "229
B. George P. Fletcher: Loyalty as Actualizing the "Historical Self'
Maclntyre's qualified praise of what might be termed
nationalism has been countered with a powerful internationalist
critique. Martha Nussbaum's essay Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism
typifies the response.230 For Nussbaum, nationality and ethnicity are
mere accidents of birth, and therefore can have no significance in a
moral theory.231 She argues that we should see ourselves not as
citizens of any particular nation, but as citizens of the world
connected with one another by universal values that transcend
national borders.232
It was to this sort of position that George P. Fletcher responded
to in his 1993 book, Loyalty.233 At the level of moral theory,
Fletcher's book owes a great debt to Maclntyre; Fletcher has little
patience for the claim that community bonds should not figure in a
theory of morality. "There is no easy response," he argues, "to the
idealist who insists that all five billion people constitute one
community, with one cause. ' '2' Rather, Fletcher contends, a theory
of morality "must begin with an understanding of how we as human
beings are constituted and what our natural limits of sympathy may
be.
235
Those "natural limits of sympathy," for Fletcher, are found at the
boundaries of certain of our basic relationships with others. These
relationships are "collectives" such as "families, tribes, and nations"
that are in some sense larger than the individual participants
themselves.23 6 Precisely because these collectives precede the arrival
229. Id.
230. See Martha Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in FOR LOVE OF
COUNTRY 2, 2-17 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996).
231. See id. at 7.
232. See id. at 8-17.
233. See FLETCHER, supra note 211, at 25. The book is the only major consideration in
the literature of the relationship between law and loyalty.
234. Id. at 21.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 15. Marriage, as Fletcher notes, does not seem to fit this model. See id.
This is a significant problem for Fletcher's theory, since marriage is where most people
commonly experience loyalty-a loyalty that is sometimes tested. It is also a practical
problem for his book, which, on the foundation of his definition of loyalty, makes a strong
case for the spousal evidentiary privilege. See id. at 79-82.
1790 [Vol. 82
JAPANESE-AMERICAN "TREASON"
of each new member and survive his demise, Fletcher argues, they
help form each member's identity. They "enter[] into our sense of
who we are. '237  In their particular national, cultural, linguistic,
political, and religious commitments, they form what Fletcher calls a
person's "historical self. '238
For Fletcher, this aspect of our humanity-the fact that our
history helps form our identity-entails moral obligations. Just as for
a utilitarian the central human capacity for pleasure and pain gives
rise to the duty to maximize the former and minimize the latter, and
just as for a Kantian the central human capacity for reason gives rise
to a duty to treat others with the respect and dignity that their
autonomy demands, so does the central fact that we are formed by
historically grounded relationships entail obligations." Those
obligations are "duties of loyalty toward the families, groups, and
nations that enter into our self-definition.
240
Although the loyalty duties of the historical self run to other
people and to collectives of people, it is the historical self who reaps
the moral benefit of performing them. On Fletcher's view,
obligations of loyalty to others do not really serve others; because
they derive from the role of others on each person's sense of self,
performing these duties is "an expression of self-esteem and self-
acceptance.'241 If a person is to love himself, he "must respect and
cherish those aspects of [him]self that are bound up with others. '"242
The path to self-actualization is, for Fletcher, the path of loyalty to
the historical self.
Fletcher faults moral theory for not taking sufficient account of
the importance of the historical self and its obligations of loyalty.243
He does not dispute that the various prevailing liberal theories of
morality-those of Bentham, Kant, and Rawls-accurately describe
genuine moral imperatives of fair and equal treatment.244 But he
maintains that those liberal theories are only intelligible within the
237. Id. at 16. Fletcher here aligns himself with Carol Gilligan in her famous assertion
that the emphasis on individuation in the study of children's moral development slights a
different, and more typically female, path of moral development that depends on the
child's place in, and care for, her human relationships. See id. at 15 (citing CAROL
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982)).
238. Id. at 17.




243. Id. at 18.
244. Id. at 18-19.
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constraints of a relationship-based theory of moral obligation.24 It is
here that Fletcher extends Maclntyre's work most helpfully.
Loyalties "circumscribe communitarian circles" within which the
liberal norms of impartiality and equality govern.246 Loyalty "to the
group and its purposes provides the basis ... for counting some
people in and others out, for believing that insiders count for more
and outsiders less. '247  This "insider/outsider" image might seem
uncomfortable, but it describes something quite real: Which parent
believes that because she gives an allowance equally to her own two
children, she must give that same amount (or, for that matter, any
amount) to the neighbor's kids? Which adult believes that if she
chooses to care for her parents at home in their old age, she must
support everyone's parents?
Again, it bears emphasis that Fletcher describes a moral system
that is based in the "natural limits" of human sympathy.248 Those
natural limits correspond to the concentric boundaries of our
historical selves. It is within those boundaries that we are able to
"grasp the humanity of [our] fellow citizens and ... treat them as
bearers of equal rights. 2 49 Thus loyalty is for Fletcher, as it is for
Maclntyre, "a critical element in a theory of justice," because it
provides us with our basis for "group cohesion, for caring about
others, for seeing them not as strangers who threaten our security but
as partners in a common venture. "250
Of course, therein also lies the danger. Because a shared history
sets the boundary between partners in the national enterprise and
strangers to it, loyalty would seem to carry with it a risk that we will
sometimes misperceive that boundary. This was an aspect of what
Maclntyre meant when he tempered his defense of patriotism with
the admission that it is a "permanent source of moral danger." For
Maclntyre, this danger was central and inevitable: so confident was
he of his claim about the ever present moral danger of loyalty that he
asserted that the claim "could not in fact be successfully rebutted. 251
To the extent that MacIntyre found the danger tolerable, it was only
because he was confident that a regime of liberal (as contrasted to
loyalty-based) morality carries a corresponding permanent danger to
245. Id. at 20.
246. See id. at 20.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 21.
249. Id.
250. Id.




This is where Fletcher and MacIntyre appear to part company.
Fletcher concedes the danger. He notes that one recurring meaning
of loyalty has been a demand for what he calls "political reliability." 23
He observes that "[i]n questions of loyalty and fidelity to the national
cause, questions are often raised about people who stand slightly
outside the mainstream, those to whom the insiders can attribute dual
loyalties. ' 254  He lists Jews, Catholics, gays and lesbians, and
Communists as examples.2 5 But Fletcher treats this facet of loyalty as
something apart from loyalty itself: it is a "tangent[] off [the] core
meaning of loyalty," a "deviation from the central ethic of loyalty.
256
And thus defined away, the troublesome tendency of loyalty to heap
suspicion on outsiders largely disappears from Fletcher's work.257
C. Loyalty and the Shitara Sisters
These two leading theorists of loyalty, MacIntyre and Fletcher,
both acknowledge the dangers of a moral theory grounded in the
affinities of insiders and their natural limits. Maclntyre embraces
those dangers, recognizing that they are inevitable. His endorsement
of loyalty is therefore rather muted and conflicted; he recognizes that
patriotism is both essential to the national project and in constant
danger of excess. Fletcher, on the other hand, sees the dangerous
facets of loyalty as tangents-deviant phenomena that do not infect
loyalty at its core. As a result, Fletcher is able to endorse loyalty
more unambiguously as a virtue.
258
252. See id. at 56.
253. FLETCHER, supra note 211, at 22.
254. Id.
255. See id. at 21-22. Racial and ethnic groups are a curious omission from Fletcher's
list.
256. Id.
257. A version of this more dangerous meaning reappears briefly in Fletcher's book
when he expresses his unwillingness to sign a loyalty oath that his employer requires. See
id. at 65-68. It also makes a brief appearance in the book's final pages, when Fletcher
concedes the risk that loyalty will devolve into Balkanization in our current multicultural
society. See id. at 172-75. But nowhere in the book does Fletcher return in a sustained
way to the problematic "tangential" version of loyalty that* he notes but sets aside at the
book's beginning. In Fletcher's interesting diagnosis of the disappearance of the crime of
treason from the legal landscape that is published in this volume, the dangerous "political"
meaning of loyalty also plays no role. See George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About
Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1605, 1606-07 (2004).
258. Fletcher does not, of course, suggest that the communitarian virtue of loyalty can
or should entirely supplant norms of impersonal, liberal morality. He suggests that the
two moral systems-the morality of loyalty and liberal morality-are ultimately
irreconcilable with one another, and that our task is to live our lives in a way that meets
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The treason trial of the Shitara sisters tends to confirm
Maclntyre's relative ambivalence toward national loyalty more than
Fletcher's relative enthusiasm for it. Fletcher is, of course, absolutely
correct when he explains that a universalist theory of morality, which
insists on like treatment of all six-billion-plus humans on the planet,
ignores how "we as human beings are constituted" and exceeds our
"natural limits of sympathy. 2 59 But the Shitara sisters' experience
reminds us that our "natural limits of sympathy" tend to contract in
times of pressure and crisis, and that at those times "we as human
beings are constituted" to misperceive threats and alliances.
Looking back at the trial from our vantage point sixty years later,
where is the proof that Toots Wallace, Flo Otani, and Billie Tanigoshi
intended to betray the United States and to support the Axis Powers
when they drove Heinrich Haider and Hermann Loescher to New
Mexico? We find it in a few simple facts: they looked Japanese, they
were of Japanese ancestry, and they were unfaithful to their
husbands. That is all there was. The government's proof was not that
they actually intended treason. It was that, given their ethnicity and
gender, they must have intended treason-they could not have
intended anything but betrayal. As Japanese people (even though
American citizens), their sympathies must have run to Japan and its
ally, Germany. As women adulterers, they must have been incapable
of national loyalty. The prosecutor could not have made it any
clearer in his rebuttal summation: a woman who would betray her
husband would not think twice about betraying her country.W
The value of loyalty, George Fletcher argued, is that it is the
practice by which we develop and actualize our "historical selves,"
those parts of our own identities that we share with others in our
family, community, religious, cultural, and national groups.261 But
whose "historical self" did this deployment of the law of treason
bolster? Which shared or communal components of American
identity did the Shitara treason case confirm and reenforce?
There were two such components: whiteness and maleness. It is
not a distortion of the historical record to say that the conviction of
the Shitara sisters was the product of an alliance of white men. I refer
here not just to the white men in law enforcement-the FBI agents
and the lawyers in Washington and in Denver-who crafted the
the challenge of uniting them. See FLETCHER, supra note 211, at 172-75.
259. See id. at 21.
260. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 236-38 and accompanying text.
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charges. I refer not just to the judge, or to the jurors-twelve white
men, in keeping with the jury selection practices of the time262 -who
adjudicated the charges. I refer also to the sisters' most immediate
victims-their cuckolded husbands, one of whom (Virgil Wallace)
was white, and the other of whom, while half-white, drew attention
for the daughter he had by his side, a daughter who, in the words of a
newspaper reporter, "had the pale eyes and the brownish hair of [her
father's] Anglo-Saxon blood. '263 And I refer also, and perhaps most
emphatically, to the enemy soldiers, Heinrich Haider and Hermann
Loescher, whose cooperation and testimony led to the Shitara sisters'
conviction. This trial was quite a spectacle because it presented a
constitutional curiosity: Article III requires proof of treason by two
witnesses,264 and here, the two witnesses were enemy soldiers who
themselves owed no allegiance to the United States.265 They were,
however, white soldiers. They were Axis soldiers, but for the
purposes of calling into question the loyalty of three American
women of Japanese ancestry they were safe allies. Only in this cadre
of white men could the prosecutor's insinuations about the loyalties
of Japanese-American women so powerfully resonate.
In sum, the Shitara treason trial is no ringing endorsement of the
use of the crime of treason to actualize the American "historical self."
The trial suggests that, at least at a time of conflict and crisis,
Americans defined their "historical self" too narrowly, and ascribed
mistaken meanings to, and suspect motives for, the actions of those
who seemed not to be within the boundaries of that self. This was a
lesson that would be repeated six years later, in a case that again
grabbed the headlines, when the government brought treason charges
against Iva Toguri d'Aquino, or "Tokyo Rose," as she was mistakenly
called."6 D'Aquino was an American citizen of Japanese ancestry
who got caught in Japan when the war began and worked for a time
262. Women were not eligible to serve on Colorado juries until 1945. See 3B 1935
COLO. STAT. ANN. (1952 Replacement Volume) chap. 95, § 1 (1952). Jury selection
procedures in federal district court followed the practice of the state in which the district
sat. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 190 (1946).
263. Foster, supra note 199.
264. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
265. This odd arrangement also occurred in the treason trial of Max Stephan. See
Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 95 (6th Cir. 1943) (reasoning that enemy
eyewitnesses were eligible to testify in the trial of an American citizen charged with
treason).
266. See Stanley I. Kutler, Forging a Legend: The Treason of "Tokyo Rose," 1980 Wis.
L. REV. 1341, 1377-82 (1980). The name "Tokyo Rose" was a misnomer because there
was no such broadcaster; "Tokyo Rose" was a generic name that American servicemen
created to refer to all female broadcasters for Radio Tokyo. See id. at 1343.
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as an English-language disc jockey on Radio Tokyo, spinning records
on a program broadcast to American troops in the Pacific Theater.267
A rabid press made her out to be a Mata Hari at the heart of Japan's
propaganda machine.26  The evidence, however, barely supported
even a single treasonous utterance. A jury nonetheless convicted her
of treason.26 9 Throughout her lengthy incarceration, she maintained
her innocence and her loyalty to the United States; President Ford
pardoned her in 1977.270 The leading chronicler of her trial saw her as
a scapegoat, a "symbolic sacrifice" to the ambitions and fears of a
handful of bureaucrats and their "stringent, politically expedient
meaning of loyalty. '2 71  The d'Aquino case implies that what
happened to the Shitara sisters was no freak occurrence, but a
reflection of a risk underlying efforts to enforce national loyalty
through the crime of treason. Altering slightly the words of Alisdair
MacIntyre, 272 we might say that the crime of treason poses a
permanent (and not merely a tangential)273 risk of moral danger.
CONCLUSION: A JAPANESE-AMERICAN STORY
The trial of the Shitara sisters deserves a prominent place in the
literature on law and loyalty, because it shows with rare clarity how
the urge to punish for betrayal can stem from unhealthy and mistaken
needs to draw false boundaries. For this reason, however, the Shitara
treason trial should also safely emerge from the shadows and occupy
a prominent place in the literature on the wartime incarceration of
Japanese Americans. The prosecution of the Shitara sisters indicates
the overpowering force of the xenophobic presumption at the heart of
the government's entire wartime program. One of the grievous flaws
267. See id. at 1342-52.
268. See id. at 1356-57.
269. See United States v. d'Aquino, 192 F.2d 338, 347 (9th Cir. 1951).
270. See David Bird, Ford Pardons "Tokyo Rose" in One of Last Official Acts As
President, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,1977, at 8.
271. Kutler, supra note 266, at 1382; see also LESLIE Bow, BETRAYAL AND OTHER
ACTS OF SUBVERSION: FEMINISM, SEXUAL POLITICS, AND ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN'S
LITERATURE 7 (2001) ("The story of Tokyo Rose speaks to a belief in the power of sexual
alliances to disrupt other collective alliances, specifically loyalty to nation and comrades-
in-arms.").
272. See Maclntyre, supra note 209, at 43-58.
273. See FLETCHER, supra note 211, at 22. In his contribution to this Symposium,
George Fletcher offers an explanation for the disappearance of treason from our legal
landscape. See Fletcher, supra note 257, at 1606. Fletcher argues that treason is at its core
a crime that depends on a feudal relationship between sovereign and subject that no
longer exists. See id. passim. Fletcher's account of the disappearance of treason is entirely




of the eviction and incarceration program was, of course, the absence
of legal process.2 74 There was no notice, there were no hearings, there
was no judge, and there was no appeal. Everyone just had to leave
and submit to detention. But it is also important to notice that the
program of eviction and incarceration had no legal standard, no
defined offense, and no burden of proof. The substantive attribution
of disloyalty to Japanese Americans in early 1942 was therefore
vague, shadowy, and impossible to quantify.
At the treason trial of the Shitara sisters, by contrast, all the
standards were clear and precise. To brand the sisters as traitors and
take away their liberty, the prosecutor had to prove that they acted
with the specific intent to hinder America's cause and advance that of
its enemies.271 And he had to prove this not just by a preponderance
of the evidence, or by clear and convincing evidence. He had to
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.
276
Justice Department lawyers went to the jury on that issue with
nothing. They had no testimony, no documentary proof, no
admissions, not even a plausible theory. They had only the
unadorned facts that Toots, Flo, and Billie were born to Japanese
parents and that they were adulterers. On the basis of that evidence,
twelve jurors found an intent to betray the United States beyond a
reasonable doubt, and a judge upheld their finding. In the eyes of the
twelve white men who judged them, it was their female susceptibility
to seduction that unmoored them from their loyalty to America. But
it was their ethnicity-the "undiluted racial strains" of affinity to
Japan, as General DeWitt had called them277-that reattached their
displaced loyalty to the cause of the Axis Powers. And it did that
beyond a reasonable doubt. This, then, shows in sharp relief the
extraordinary probative force of the simple fact of Japanese ancestry
during World War II. It equated with the highest quantum of proof
known to our legal system.
Seen in this light, the Shitara sisters' treason trial deserves a
secure place in the literature on the wartime incarceration of
Japanese Americans. To be sure, it is a tale of foolishness and
misbehavior. As a purely technical matter, it is the case that the
literature says should not exist: a conspiracy to commit treason by
274. See Chris K. lijima, Reparations and the "Model Ministry" Ideology of
Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REV.
385,396 (1998).
275. See United States v. Stephan, 133 F.2d 87, 92 (6th Cir. 1943).
276. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253 (1910).
277. See DeWitt Memorandum, supra note 2.
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Japanese Americans on the United States mainland. But in truth it is
not a tale of disloyalty to America, the decision of twelve white jurors
in 1944 Denver notwithstanding. It is rather a tale of presumed
disloyalty. And that presumption touched not just Toots, Flo, and
Billie. It touched every American citizen of Japanese ancestry alive
in the United States when the bombs fell on the ships at Pearl
Harbor.
